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KEEPING THE Boss AT BAY POST-
TERMINATION RETALIATION UNDER TITLE VII:
CHARLTON V. PARAmus BoARD OF EDUCATION,
25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994)
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 defines unlawful
employment discrimination and provides relief for employees
discriminated against by their employers.2 An employee claiming
employment discrimination must file charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which notifies
the employer of the charges and investigates the employee's
complaint.3 Anticipating that some employers might further
discriminate against employees, Congress proscribed retaliation
against "employees" and "applicants for employment" who file
employment discrimination charges. 4 Some employees do not
I. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
2. Section 703 defines unlawful employment practices to include failing
or refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against an indi-
vidual "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
Section 706 lists the following remedies available to a successful claimant:
"[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without backpay ..... .or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
3. Title VII created the EEOC to investigate charges of employment
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a), 2000e-5(b) (1988).
If an investigation discovers reasonable cause to believe that a charge is
true, the statute instructs the EEOC to attempt to eliminate the unlawful
employment practice "by informal methods of conference, conciliation and
persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC fails to eliminate the
unlawful practice through informal methods, it may file suit against the
employer or authorize the aggrieved party to bring suit. Id. § 2000e-5(f). If
the EEOC investigation does not result in a reasonable belief that the charge
is true, or if the EEOC fails to file a civil action within 180 days of the
charge, the employee may request a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC and
may sue the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t) (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988). Section 704 states that
lI]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for em-
ployment ... because [the employee] has opposed a practice made
unlawful by this subchapter, or because [the employee] has made
a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an
Washington University Open Scholarship
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file charges under Title VII against their employer until after
their employment relationship ends. 5 Courts disagree on whether
such former employees are protected as "employees" under
Title VII. 6 In Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education,7 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the word "employee" 8
in Title VII includes former employees, allowing an ex-employee
to sue a previous employer for retaliatory acts related to, but
occurring after, the employment relationship has ended.9
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
The purpose of the retaliation provision "is to protect the employee who
utilized the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights." Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969).
See generally Patricia A. Moore, Parting is Such Sweet Sorrow: The
Application of Title VII to Post-Employment Retaliation, 62 FoRDHAM L.
Rv. 205 (1993) (analyzing applicability of § 704 to post-employment retaliation
claims); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INwus. & CoM.
L. REv. 431 (1965) (analyzing the legislative history of Title VII).
5. Retaliation against a former employer may take many forms. See, e.g.,
Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990), (per-
suading new employer to terminate employee), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943
(1990); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (giving unfavor-
able references); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978)
(refusing to furnish references); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139
(6th Cir. 1977) (informing prospective employer of discrimination charge);
Cohen v. S.U.P.A., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 251, 259-60 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (cancelling
employee's health benefits); EEOC v. Metzger, 824 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1993)
(informing prospective employer of discrimination charge); Miles v. J.C.
Penney, Inc., No. CIV. A. 89-0881-CA, 1991 WL 326498 at *1-2 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 31, 1991) (same).
6. A number of circuits hold that the term "employee" in § 704 includes
former employees. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527
(lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850
F.2d-1506 (11th Cir. 1988); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052
(2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162
(10th Cir. 1977). However, several circuits have adopted a more restrictive
definition of "employee." See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992);
Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
7. 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
8. Title VII defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an
employer .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988).
9. 25 F.3d 194, 200. A number of courts allow antidiscrimination actions
under § 703 of Title VII in the absence of an employment relationship. See
Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Medical Ctr., 842 F.2d 291, 293-95 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a hospital's ability to control staff privileges will support a
plaintiff's claim); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Fort Wayne, 788 F.2d 411,
422-24 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that § 703 uses the term "individual," not
"employee"); Shehadeh v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland,
595 F.2d 711, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that § 703 applies when a
former employer interferes with an ex-employee's future employment oppor-
tunities); Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (noting that a hospital's ability to affect employment opportunities ishttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/8
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In Charlton, a teacher sued her former employer alleging that
she was terminated after she resisted her supervisor's sexual
advances.10 Charlton further alleged that the administrators of
her former school district retaliated against her for filing the
Title VII suit by seeking revocation of her state teaching certi-
fication. The district court granted the school district's motion
for summary judgment on the retaliation charge, reasoning that
Charlton was not an employee of the school district within the
meaning of Title VII at the time of the alleged retaliation.'2 On
appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and re-
sufficient to support a plaintiff's claim); LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 777 F.
Supp. 1378, 1380 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that § 703 applies when employer
controls access to employment opportunities for non-employees).
10. 25 F.3d at 196. Ann Mery Charlton was a tenured music supervisor
and taught in the Paramus School District for seventeen years. Id. She alleged
that her supervisor, Janice Dime, the Assistant Superintendent of Schools for
the Paramus School District, made unwanted sexual advances toward her. Id.
She alleged that after she rejected Dime's sexual advances, Dime and other
"lesbian teachers" formed a conspiracy to discredit her, which eventually led
to the revocation of her tenure and the loss of her job. Id.
The Paramus School Board claimed that it took action against Charlton
because Charlton had spread "vicious and false rumors about the sexual
preferences and sexual activities of Paramus administrators and employees
... " and had implied that hiring practices in the district were controlled by
the sexual orientation of employees and their sexual relationships with admin-
istrators. Id. The school board also alleged that Charlton had used malicious
language when referring to administrators and other teachers, and had sought
information about Janice Dime's personal life in an effort to discredit her.
Id.
Charlton unsuccessfully challenged her termination before a state admin-
istrative board and the New Jersey Superior Court. Id. She then filed a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC while she awaited a decision on her petition
for appeal before the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. When the New Jersey
Supreme Court denied her appeal, she filed a Title VII action. Id.
11. Id. Charlton alleged that the school district initiated proceedings to
revoke her teaching certification following her filing of a Title VII claim. Id.
Charlton further alleged that although the school district had no role in the
certification review process beyond reporting a teacher's termination to the
state, the school district attempted to revoke Charlton's certification nearly
two years after her termination. Id. Additionally, Charlton alleged that the
school district offered to stop the certification review process if Charlton
agreed not to pursue her charge of discrimination. Id.
12. Id. at 198. In granting the school district's motion, the district court
relied on Ferguson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 443 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (holding post-employment blacklisting not actionable under § 703 of Title
VII), aff'd without opinion, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979). The Charlton court
distinguished Ferguson in part because it dealt with a § 703 claim while
Charlton's claim dealt with § 704. Charlton, 25 F.3d at 198.
In its unreported decision, the district court also granted summary judgment
for the school district on Charlton's discrimination and hostile work environ-
ment claims. Id. at 197.Washington University Open Scholarship
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manded with instructions that the district court broadly interpret
the retaliation provision of Title VII to allow a former employee
relief from employment-related retaliation by a former em-
ployer. 3
To address the problem of discrimination in employment,
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14
This statute directs employees to file charges of discrimination
with the EEOC.15 If a federal court finds an employer guilty of
committing unlawful employment practices, Title VII authorizes
a variety of remedies including enjoining the unlawful employ-
ment practice, reinstatement, back pay, other appropriate eq-
uitable remedies, or compensatory and punitive damages.' 6
Additionally, Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating
against employees or applicants for employment who have ex-
ercised their rights under Title VII.17 Most retaliatory actions
13. 25 F.3d at 202.
14. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 287 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2401. Congress enacted Title VII to "eliminate ... discrimi-
nation in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin." Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). The statute instructs the EEOC to
investigate the charge to determine whether there is probable cause to believe
the charge is true. Id. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. If the EEOC
finds probable cause, Title VII mandates that the Commission attempt to end
the unlawful practices through informal interaction with the employer. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Should informal
conciliation methods fail, the EEOC may sue the employer in federal court.
Id. If the EEOC finds no probable cause to believe the charge is true, or
otherwise fails to take action to end the alleged unlawful employment practices,
the aggrieved employee may seek permission from the Commission to bring a
private action under Title VII. Id. If the Commission issues a "right to sue
letter," the employee may commence a civil suit against the employer under
Title VII. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988). See supra note 2 discussing remedies
available under Title VII. Additionally, in 1991, Congress amended Title VII
to make compensatory and punitive damages available to victims of unlawful
employment practices. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reads that "[i]n an action
brought by a complaining party under ... the Civil Rights Act of 1964
against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination
prohibited under § 704 ... the complaining party may recover compensatory
and punitive damages .... ." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 102(1), 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) (amended 1993).
The ability to obtain legal remedies, as a result of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, is an additional argument for broadly interpreting § 704. Moore, supra
note 4, at 218 n.85. See also, EEOC: Policy Guide on Compensatory and
Punitive Damages Under 1991 Civil Rights Act, 7 FAir EMPL. PAc. RP.
(BNA) 405:7091 (July 7, 1992); John M. Husband & Jude Biggs, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Expanding Remedies in Employment Discrimination Cases,
CoLo. LAw., May 1992, at 881.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988). This section provides that "[ilt shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against anyhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/8
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occur during the employment relationship.' 8 In some cases,
however, an employee whose employment relationship has ended
will face retaliation from his or her former employer. 19 The
federal courts disagree concerning a former employee's right to
redress for retaliation under Title VII. Giving effect to the
remedial character of Title VII, some courts interpret the statute
broadly to include former employees. 20 Other courts hold that
of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge ... under this subchapter." Id.
In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation under
§ 704, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (I) the employee engaged in conduct
protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse action against the
employee; and (3) a causal link exists between the employee's protected conduct
and the employer's adverse action. Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 747 F.
Supp. 1118, 1128 (D.N.J. 1990) (citing Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701,
708 (3d Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990).
18. Moore, supra note 4, at 205.
19. Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1994).
"Retaliation claims can often arise post-employment when an employee who
has been terminated files an action under Title VII charging discrimination in
discharge only to meet continued harassment from its employers in retaliation
for the filing of the action." Id.
20. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (lth Cir.
1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 943 (1990); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581
F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565
F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Metzger, 824 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1993);
Miles v. J.C. Penney, Inc., No. CIV. A. 89-0881-CA, 1991 WL 326498 at *1
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 1991); Bahu v. Fuller O'Brien Paints, 41 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1231 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Atkinson v. Oliver T. Carr Co., 40
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1041 (D.D.C. 1986); Bilka v. Pepe's, Inc., 601
F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. II. 1984); Sparrow v. Piedmont Health Sys. Agency,
Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1107 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Helwig v. Suburban Chevrolet, 33
Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1261 (D.Md. 1983); Czarnowski v. Desoto, Inc.,
495 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. I11. 1981); EEOC v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp.,
495 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Va. 1980).
The Supreme Court has approved interpretations of remedial statutes that
are consistent with the "purpose and objective" of the statute. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (expressing preference for broad
reading of statute over strict reading where consistent with purpose and
objective of statute); EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir.
1993) ("The antiretaliation provision of an employment statute should not be
construed narrowly if it defeats the purpose of the statute.").
Courts have construed "employee" in the retaliation provision of several
other federal employment discrimination statutes to include former employees.
See, e.g., Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-31 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (interpreting retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) and noting that cases used to interpret the ADEA are
frequently relied upon in interpreting Title VII); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821
F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Shop,
548 F.2d 139, 142, 147 (6th Cir. 1977) (rejecting a narrow reading of parallel
retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and holdingWashington University Open Scholarship
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the rules of statutory interpretation require courts to interpret
Title VII according to its plain meaning, which excludes former
employees from claiming retaliation. 21
Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce,2 an early case
interpreting the retaliation provision of Title VII, protected
former employees from retaliation. In Rutherford, a former
bank employee claimed retaliation in violation of Title VII after
her former supervisor told a prospective employer about Ruth-
erford's Title VII charge of employment discrimination.3 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the bank's contention
that because Rutherford was not an employee of the bank when
the alleged retaliation occurred, there was no violation of the
retaliation provision of Title VII.24 The court ruled that a
decision based on a literal reading of the statute would result
in an unjustifiably narrow interpretation.Y The court held that
the remedial nature of Title VII required courts to construe the
retaliation provision broadly, to include former employees. 26
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a similar in-
terpretation of Title VII in Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co. 27 In
Pantchenko, a female chemist filed retaliation charges against
her employer six months after her resignation, alleging that her
former employer refused to give her a letter of recommendation
and made disparaging remarks about her to prospective em-
ployers.2 The court noted that although Title VII fails to
mention former employees, "a narrow construction would not
give effect to the statute's purpose," to provide relief against
discrimination in connection with a "prospective, present or past
employment relationship. ' 29 The Pantchenko court, cautioning
that the provision applies to former employees); Hodgson v. Charles Martin
Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that
former employees require protection from retaliation under the FLSA).
21. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992); Reed v. Shepard,
939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
22. 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
23. Id. at 1163. Rutherford worked as a loan officer trainee. She resigned
when her supervisor directed her to perform clerical duties after a secretary
quit. Id.
24. Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1165.
25. Id. at 1164-65.
26. Id. The Rutherford court relied heavily on Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet
Shop, 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Moore, supra note 4, at 211-18
(interpreting § 704 by analogy to other remedial employment statutes).
27. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978).
28. Id. at 1054.
29. Id. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's entry of summary
judgment for the defendant on plaintiff's retaliation claim. Id. at 1055.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/8
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against interpreting statutes literally, ° held that the retaliation
provision of Title VII applies to discrimination "related to or
arising out of the employment relationship," regardless of the
plaintiff's status as an employee at the time of the discrimina-
tion.3
One court, interpreting Title VII more broadly than most
other courts, granted a former employee relief from retaliation
even though the retaliation was unrelated to an employment
relationship.3 2 In Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet,33 an automobile
salesperson filed charges under Title VII alleging that his former
employer accused him of forgery in retaliation for his filing of
an employment discrimination charge with the EEOC.3 4 The
United States District Court for the District of Colorado held
that retaliation against an employee for filing a Title VII claim
is actionable "regardless of whether it interferes with an em-
ployment relationship. '35
While some courts interpret Title VII's retaliation provision
broadly, some recent decisions have narrowly construed the
section's applicability to employees. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals followed this view in Reed v. Shepard.36 In Reed, a
female civilian jailer alleged that her employer retaliated against
her for filing charges under Title VII after her termination. 7
The court denied Reed relief, noting that the alleged retaliation
occurred after Reed's termination and was "not an adverse
employment action." 38 The court held that actionable retaliation
30. Id. The court noted Learned Hand's observation that "it is a com-
monplace [sic] that a literal interpretation of the words of a statute is not
always a safe guide to its meaning." Id. The court also argued that "once an
employment relationship has been created, use of the term 'employee' in
referring to a former employee, while colloquial, is not inappropriate." Id.
31. Pantchenko, 581 F.2d at 1055.
32. Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 804 F. Supp. 121 (D. Colo. 1992).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 130-31.
35. Id. at 136. The court declined to follow Polsby. See infra notes 42-48
and accompanying text. Instead, the opinion relied heavily on Rutherford, as
teaching "a liberal reading of this remedial statute." Judge Babcock found
that "Congress' intent of protecting EEOC complainants from retaliation is
furthered when all forms of retaliation, not just those related to employment,
are cognizable under section [704]." Berry, 804 F. Supp. 121.
36. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
37. Id. at 492. The alleged retaliation took the form of an investigation
of Reed's work activities before a grand jury, a "mysterious attack on her
person by a disguised assailant" who urged Reed to drop her case against the
department, "disturbing late-night phone calls threatening her with reprisals
for her lawsuit," and "someone shooting at her car with a gun while she was
driving." Id.
38. Id. at 492-93.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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involves an employee's discharge or other discrimination, and
"not events subsequent to and unrelated to his or her employ-
ment." 39
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded on the Reed
holding in Polsby v. Chase.40 In Polsby, a former employee of
the National Institute of Health (NIH) filed charges against the
NIH under Title VII after her employment contract ended. 4'
The Fourth Circuit held that Title VII's retaliation provision
does not protect former employees. 42 The court's opinion criti-
cized other circuits for "bas[ing] their decisions entirely on
39. Id. at 493. The Reed court noted that the plaintiff might have obtained
relief under criminal or tort law instead of Title VII. Id.
40. 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir.) vacated sub nom., Polsby v. Shalala, 113 S.
Ct. 1940 (1993).
41. Id. at 1362. Polsby alleged that her employer retaliated against her by
writing a letter to the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology which
erroneously denied her residency credit for her time at the NIH, and by failing
to correct the letter at her request. Id. at 1362, 1364.
42. Id. at 1365. The Polsby court relied in part on Judge Tjoflat's special
concurrence in Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied 491 U.S. 943 (1990). The Sherman majority followed Bailey v.
USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988), which held that § 704 applies to
former employees. In his concurrence, Judge Tjoflat wrote that while he was
bound by prior Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that prior decisions may
only be overruled by the court sitting en banc, he was also convinced that
Bailey was erroneously decided. He argued that § 704 does not create a post-
employment retaliatory action for money damages because the availability of
a state tort action for malicious and intentional interference with contract
obviated the need for a § 704 action. Sherman, 891 F.2d 1541 (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring), citing Nager v. Lad 'n Dad Slacks, 251 S.E.2d 330, 333 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1978).
The Polsby court applied this reasoning in stating that former employees
should seek state or federal legal remedies against former employers. The
court also suggested that plaintiffs bring Title VII actions against the pro-
spective employer who refuses to hire, rather than against the former employer
who blacklists. Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1366.
Judge Tjoflat then embarked on an exhaustive analysis of the proper scope
of § 704. Reflecting on principles of judicial construction, Judge Tjoflat
argued that courts should read § 704 strictly to allow relief only to current
employees and applicants for employment. Judge Tjoflat bolstered his argu-
ment by stressing that Title VII contains no clear congressional intent for a
broad application. In addition, the equitable nature of Title VII, and the fact
that the statute was not intended to provide money damages for former
employees indicates that the statute should be interpreted narrowly. Sherman,
891 F.2d at 1538. But see NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972)
(encouraging a broad interpretation of remedial statutes); EEOC v. Ohio
Edison, 7 F.3d 551, 545 (6th Cir. 1993) (criticizing a narrow construction that
defeats the statute's purposes). But cf. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166 § 102(1), 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) (amending Title VII to provide for
compensatory and punitive damages).
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dubious considerations of policy" and for failing to rely on the
statute's clear language. 43 The opinion analyzed the history of
Title VII44 and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States concerning statutory construction, which the court read
to require a plain language interpretation of the retaliation
provision .4  The Polsby court also noted that the legislative
history showed no intent by Congress to provide relief to former
employees.46
Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education47 presented the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals with its first opportunity to interpret
the scope of the term "employees" in Title VII's retaliation
provision. The Charlton court agreed with the view of other
courts that a strict interpretation of "employees" would under-
cut the remedial intent of Title VII by permitting employers to
retaliate with impunity against former employees. 4 Accordingly,
the court rejected a strict definition of the term "employees"
43. Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365.
44. Id. at 1365-67. "[Ihe paucity of legislative history, if offering any
guidance... actually supports a normal reading of the statute without adding
former employees." Id. citing Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1536-42 (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of the legislative history of Title VII see Vaas,
supra note 4.
45. 970 F.2d at 1365, 1367. "[W]here, as here, the statute's language is
plain, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."'
Id. at 1365 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 241
(1989)) (citations omitted). "We are bound to follow the clear language of
the statute absent a 'scrivener's error' producing an absurd result." Polsby,
970 F.2d at 1367 (quoting Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 112 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
46. 970 F.2d at 1365.
47. 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
48. Id. at 200. The court noted the decisions in Bailey v. USX Corp., 850
F.2d 1506, 1509 (1lth Cir. 1988) ("[A] strict and narrow interpretation of the
word "employee" to exclude former employees would undercut the obvious
remedial purposes of Title VII."), and Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935
F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("To read the statute otherwise would be to
deny protection to any person who has suffered discharge or termination due
to unlawful discrimination.").
The court concluded that "Congress did not intend Title VII's protection
against retaliation to end with termination of employment when it is the
termination itself that gives rise to the protected act of filing a Title VII
action." Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200.
The court stated that "Itihe need for protection against retaliation does
not disappear when the employment relationship ends." Id. The court also
found that postemployment retaliation may be more damaging than on-the-
job discrimination because a current employee subject to retaliation will
generally continue to receive a paycheck, "while a former employee subject
to retaliation may be prevented from obtaining any work." Id. Finally, the
court noted that under the strict interpretation of "employees" in § 704, the
"fear of unremediable reprisal would chill Title VII claims." Id.Washington University Open Scholarship
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in favor of a broad definition that included former employees.
49
The court, however, refused to expand the applicability of the
retaliation provision beyond the employment realmA0
The Chariton court announced two requirements for former
employee retaliation claims.sI First, the retaliatory act com-
plained of must be in reprisal for an act protected under Title
VII.5 2 Second, the protected conduct and the employer's retali-
atory act must arise out of or relate to the employment rela-
tionship:5 The court held that upon remand plaintiff would
bear the burden of proving the link between plaintiff filing a
Title VII charge and defendant's retaliatory act.5
4
The Third Circuit in Charlton properly declined to adopt a
strict interpretation of the term "employees" in Title VII's
retaliatory provision and correctly advocated a broad interpre-
tation that includes former employees when the alleged retalia-
tion arises out of the employment relationship. A broad
interpretation of the term "employees" makes employment dis-
crimination remedies available by not arbitrarily denying relief
to potential plaintiffs according to their employment status at
the time of the retaliation. The strict interpretation of the term
"employees," in contrast, unfairly excludes former employees
from the protection of Title VII's retaliatory provision and
allows employers to harm former employees who may have no
available legal recourse. 55 Strictly interpreting the term "em-
ployees" ignores the remedial objectives of Title VII and its
49. Id. at 200. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text and notes
38-41 and accompanying text discussing the Fourth Circuit case, Polsby, and
the Seventh Circuit case, Reed, respectively, regarding the plain meaning of
"employees" in § 704.
50. Cf. Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 804 F. Supp. 121 (D. Colo. 1992)
(holding that § 704 reaches retaliation against former employees regardless of
whether the retaliation affects an employment relationship).
51. 25 F.3d at 200.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court apparently refused to extend the application of § 704
beyond employment situations. See also Moore, supra note 4, at 220-24
(advocating a similar two-part rule for § 704 claims).
54. The court stated that on remand, Charlton would be required to show
that "but for the intervention of the school board ... the revocation pro-
ceeding would not have gone forward," and "that the school board intervened
in retaliation for her Title VII suit." 25 F.3d at 202.
55. 25 F.3d at 201. Several courts stated that former employees could seek
redress for injuries occasioned by retaliatory acts of their former employer
under state tort or criminal law or other federal statues. See supra note 42
and accompanying text. That suggestion constitutes mere speculation. The
availability of such a remedy will of course vary by state and according to
the facts of each case. On the other hand, § 704, where interpreted to include
former employees, can serve as a catch-all provision to ensure former em-
ployees a remedy.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/8
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retaliatory provision's purpose of ensuring that discrimination
victims can bring actions for relief without fear of reprisal.56
After encountering and protesting unlawful employment prac-
tices, employee frequently face retaliation for exercising their
rights under Title VII. This retaliation often occurs after em-
ployment has ended. By joining the majority of courts inter-
preting the retaliatory provision of Title VII to allow former
employees to bring retaliation claims, the Charlton court helped
ensure that the threat of retaliation will not deter discrimination
victims from enforcing their rights under Title VII.
James Francis Barna*
56. See supra notes 2-4, and 14 and accompanying text, discussing the
purposes of Title VII.
* J.D. 1996, Washington University.Washington University Open Scholarship
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